The European Union has no ability to influence OCCRP’s work. EU rules for journalism support require grant recipients to uphold editorial independence, while OCCRP’s policies bar donors from shaping or vetoing specific investigations.
Any assertions otherwise are transparently false. The weakness of this trope is easily seen in its latest deployment, triggered in the summer of 2025 by a far-right politician and republished by sympathetic media across Europe.
The affair began after Petr Bystron, a member of the European Parliament from Germany’s Alternative for Germany (AfD) party, submitted two official questions demanding to know whether the European Commission had supported OCCRP, which he described as a “globalist propaganda network.” The Commission responded that, since 2020, OCCRP had received €604,269 in EU funds for a project that provides tools and training for investigative journalism.
Bystron trumpeted this answer as “the biggest media scandal in post-war history,” alleging that OCCRP had published “negative information about EU-critical politicians, unchecked and completely uncritically.” His framing was then picked up by a range of right-wing, alternative, and Euroskeptic outlets, who aired his arguments with little scrutiny, often implying or directly asserting that the funding was a reward for manipulating the 2024 European elections.
None of these publications, nor Bystron himself, were able to tie the grant to any specific piece of OCCRP output. They could not do so: The grant — which in fact had been made public prior to Bystron’s questions — pays for capacity-building, not for editorial campaigns on specific topics.
The “election manipulation” allegation rests on a series of articles that had nothing to do with OCCRP. The stories, published in the spring of 2024 by several Central European outlets, exposed a pro-Russian influence operation that had allegedly funneled covert payments to right-wing European politicians, including Bystron. The affair was first reported by the Czech Deník N, and additional stories were then published by mainstream outlets across the continent like Der Spiegel, Le Monde, and Politico Europe. None are members of the OCCRP network, though some have partnered with OCCRP on previous projects.
It is not unreasonable to ask whether accepting government grants can erode an outlet’s independence. This is a live debate in the journalistic community, and reasonable people may disagree. As concerns OCCRP, the allegation that EU funding had curtailed critical reporting runs into a basic evidentiary problem: Our track record includes major projects that expose corruption and crime in EU member states, Western banks and companies, and EU programs.
The Azerbaijani Laundromat exposed a $2.9 billion slush fund moving through European shell companies and banks, including Denmark’s largest, and showed how it was used to pay off influential figures in European institutions. During the coronavirus pandemic, we collected data about over €20 billion in contracts and tenders across Europe, finding that many of the largest deals were direct awards with little competition and documenting weak transparency in Commission-run procurement. And in the Bad Practice project, we focused on problems with an EU-level cooperation tool whose failures allow doctors who have lost their licenses to practice in other countries.
If OCCRP were simply a tool for Brussels bureaucrats to consolidate control, it would make little sense to repeatedly publish work that embarrasses EU governments, European corporate champions, and Western enablers alongside everyone else.