Request for Additional FY 2017 Appropriations
Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO)
COUNTER-ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA (ISIS)
TRAIN AND EQUIP FUND (CTEF)
The estimated cost of this report or study for the Department of Defense is approximately $3,700 for the 2017 Fiscal Year. This includes $30 in expenses and $3,670 in DoD labor.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS:

I. Budget Summary .......................... 1
II. Requirements in Iraq ...................... 3
   A. Program Summary ..................... 5
   B. Program Description/Justification .... 7
   C. Impact if Not Funded .................. 9
III. Requirements in Syria .................. 10
   A. Program Summary ..................... 11
   B. Program Description/Justification .... 13
   C. Impact if Not Funded .................. 15
IV. Proposed Appropriations Language ..... 16
I. BUDGET SUMMARY:

The United States Government (USG) strategy to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) directed the Department of Defense (DoD) to conduct a campaign to degrade, dismantle, and ultimately defeat ISIS. A focus of DoD’s efforts is to work with and through the Government of Iraq’s (GoI) Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) in Iraq and Vetted Syrian Opposition (VSO) forces in Syria to build key security force capabilities, help professionalize their security forces, and promote longer term stability of the countries and the region.

The FY 2017 Request for Additional Appropriations formally requests the consolidation of the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) and the Syria Train and Equip Fund (STEF) into the Counter-ISIS Train and Equip Fund (CTEF). The consolidation of these two funding sources is consistent with the Administration’s direction to defeat the ISIS “by, with, and through” partners in the region and allows the Department to quickly and effectively provide assistance to foreign security forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals participating in activities to counter the ISIS. This new fund provides timely funding and flexibility to Commanders while providing the Congress with oversight of the program.

In addition to the pending FY 2017 President’s Budget request of $880 million for Iraq and Syria train and equip (T&E) efforts, the FY 2017 Request for Additional Appropriations requests an additional $626.4 million above the FY 2017 President’s Budget request for ITEF and STEF to accelerate the Department’s T&E efforts in Iraq and Syria as partners fight to retake, hold, and defend the cities of Mosul and Raqqah, and defeat ISIS in its remaining strongholds in Iraq and Syria to the collapse the group’s so-called caliphate.

- An additional $446.4 million to provide continued maintenance and sustainment support to the ISF as they fight to retake the city of Mosul. These funds address critical requirements generated by the protracted operations to seize Mosul and the higher-than-anticipated battle losses and operational costs that diverted funding and material intended for the post-Mosul reset and follow-on operations. These funds also address support for future counter-ISIS operations in Iraq.

- An additional $180.0 million to sustain the momentum of Syrian Arab Coalition (SAC) and VSO forces as they fight to retake the city of Raqqah. These funds will address critical weapons, training, ammunition, and equipment requirements necessary to outfit the 16,000 supplementary partner SAC forces. These funds will also provide support for future counter-ISIS operations in Syria.
The following is a summary of the FY 2017 CTEF budget request:

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<td><strong>+1,506.4</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,506.4</strong></td>
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</table>
II. REQUIREMENTS IN IRAQ:

The United States Government (USG) strategy to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) directed the Department of Defense (DoD) to conduct a campaign to degrade, dismantle, and ultimately defeat ISIS. A focus of DoD’s efforts is to work with and through the Government of Iraq’s (GoI) Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) to build key security force capabilities, help professionalize its security forces, and promote long-term stability of the country and the region.

The Combined Joint Task Force – Operation INHERENT RESOLVE (CJTF-OIR) conducted a detailed analysis of current requirements compared against current funding and identified substantial shortfalls and determined that an additional $446.4 million is required to fulfill urgent requirements. Additional funding is required due to the protracted operation to seize Mosul. Higher-than-anticipated battle losses and operational costs from this engagement have diverted funding and materiel intended for the post-Mosul reset and follow-on operations. Instead, these assets are being used to prosecute the current fight. Available funding is sufficient to continue supporting the ISF in Mosul and continue to operate training sites for planned courses. However, current funding levels are insufficient to allow for effective follow-on actions, concentrate combat power, or provide commander flexibility to respond quickly and decisively in this dynamic environment.

The campaign is progressing at a pace driven by the GoI because the U.S. does not have direct operational control over these forces. This creates a more fluid and less predictable future that makes projecting funding requirements extremely challenging. In order to identify the funding required, crucial assumptions must be made for FY 2017. These key assumptions include:

1. In FY 2017, the costs for equipping and training new and existing Iraqi units will decline, but the logistics requirements for supporting ongoing operations, including resupply and replacement of combat losses, will increase compared to previous fiscal year justifications.
2. Iraqi security forces will be involved in continuing major operations to isolate, clear, hold, and stabilize territory occupied by ISIS, including major population centers like Mosul.
3. Using the operations in Anbar as a reference, Mosul clearing is anticipated to be slow and highly kinetic. There will be a significant need for ammunition, anti-armor weapons, counter-IED equipment, and engineering assets to harden defensive positions; and the Iraqi forces will lose a significant amount of equipment to combat losses.
4. The effectiveness of hold forces made up of federal police, local police/security forces, and border police/security will be critical to holding liberated territory and improving security for the population and achieving U.S. objectives. Budget estimate assumes procurement of equipment to supply 20,000 of this hold force.
5. Current Building Partner Capacity (BPC) sites will continue to operate while new sites will be established as the ISF moves north to and through Mosul.
6. The Iraqi economy will continue to be weak and their government will find it difficult to fund counter-ISIS operations. U.S. and coalition support will continue to be important in paying for costs associated with the current crisis to achieve U.S. objectives.
7. Strong U.S. and coalition support, particularly highly visible support such as training and equipping, will be necessary for ISF to maintain sufficient combat power and combat skill sets to accomplish assigned and future missions.

Based on these assumptions and estimates, the Department requires continued funding to achieve U.S. objectives and assist Iraq in defeating ISIS and restore their borders. The U.S. and coalition assistance has proven effective in halting the expansion of ISIS, and will enable the Iraqi government to continue to liberate areas from ISIS control, thereby providing a safe and secure environment in which Iraq can return to a sovereign and relatively stable state. The ISF will continue to need training and equipment to be successful in combined operations, securing liberated areas, and developing a non-sectarian and integrated security capability. Timing is critical to defeat ISIS and continued financial support by the United States is required to execute the strategy, continue positive momentum, accelerate operations, exploit successes, and continue to create disruption in order to achieve the objectives as outlined by the President. These costs are considerably lower than a large scale deployment of U.S. armed forces, but still reaffirms our commitment to counter the ISIS threat.
A. PROGRAM SUMMARY:

The continued and evolving nature of the ISIS threat underscores the importance of training, advising, assisting, and equipping Iraqi Security Forces, providing an increased ability to liberate and secure lost territory, secure borders, protect the population, and enhance provincial and national defense. Support for these Iraqi Security Forces (including Iraqi Army; Kurdish Peshmerga; Ministry of Interior Police, Border Security, Emergency Response Division and other local security forces; Counter Terrorism Service; Popular Mobilization Forces; and other forces with a national security mission) demonstrates our commitment to maintaining the territorial integrity of a multi-ethnic Iraq and a unity of effort in defeating ISIS.

This request outlines requirements to continue to generate additional capacity across key Iraqi security force elements by training and equipping “hold forces,” supporting ongoing combat operations, improving maintenance and sustainment of ITEF equipment provided, and ultimately improving their ability to provide security to the population and to re-establish full sovereignty in Iraq and train them to respond to future threats. To increase ISF capabilities and achieve U.S. objectives, U.S. assistance will focus on:

- Training and equipping additional security force elements needed to hold liberated areas and establish local security.
- Providing training, equipment and supplies needed to support ongoing operations.
- Providing maintenance support and providing sustainment for equipment vital to the defeat of ISIS.
- Supporting the operation of training and engagement areas and establishing additional locations that will support Iraqi security force operations.
The following is a summary of the train and equip requirements in Iraq by line of effort:

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<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td><strong>1,076.4</strong></td>
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</table>
B. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION/JUSTIFICATION:

Equipping Additional Security Forces

Primary equipping efforts in FY 2017 focus on “hold” and local security forces. The CJTF-OIR and Iraqi government currently assess that over 30,000 “hold force” personnel are required for Anbar, Salah Ad Din, and Ninewa provinces. These security forces will need training equipment and engineering materials to make them more effective in holding liberated territory and maintaining security. This assessment calls for buying equipment to supply a 20,000 man force that will include federal police, local police/security forces, Sunni Popular Mobilization Forces, and border police. We project that the Iraqi GoI will contribute the funds and equipment for at least the remaining 10,000 to reach this goal.

Additional funding is necessary to support equipping efforts for more hold forces. These security forces require training and equipment to make them more effective in holding liberated territory and maintaining security, thereby helping prevent the outbreak of sectarian violence. The CJTF-OIR’s original intent to execute significant funding for this requirement has been severely curtailed by the need to fuel the current extended operation to retake Mosul. Continuing to divert funding for these requirements, exacerbated by long lead times, will prevent effective execution of security and rule of law in liberated areas. For example, the current hold forces for East Mosul had to be drawn from the West Mosul attack force, thereby decrementing combat power in order to fill this capability gap. The requirement accounts for half of the materiel needed to equip the originally requested 20,000 additional hold forces, not including what is already on hand or on order. The remaining requirement will be addressed with FY 2018 funding.

This funding supports the purchase of equipment and proper training to significantly enhance the ISF’s command and control; specifically, radio equipment, data networking, and training with support for the same. Effectively operating in a dispersed battle space with a force derived from multiple government ministries requires robust command and control capabilities in order to synchronize efforts across multiple axis of advance, and in multiple operations. This additional funding helps to maintain and improve upon the current communications network.

The GoI Ministry of Interior Two-Year Plan for readiness articulates capability gaps in many areas of the campaign plan to include transportation for wide area security forces, counter-IED capabilities, and communication capabilities. As such, these requirements influence the hold force security mission, command and control for wide area security forces, and the requisite ability to counter ISIS’s use of IEDs.
Combat Resupply Operations

The Iraqis will have at least 24,000 security force personnel armed with NATO-standard weapons by FY 2017 and will continue to require NATO-standard ammunition to resupply units using these weapons.

Ammunition estimates are based on operational requirements coupled with acquisition lead times. The ammunition requirement is derived from the analysis conducted by both Combined Joint Forces Land Component Command and Special Operation Joint Task Force. Estimates include training, initial issue and combat resupply. Timely ammunition combat resupply is essential to maintaining momentum, exploiting opportunities, concentrating combat power and overwhelming ISIS with firepower. Limited CONUS stock and demand has driven ammunition costs higher than anticipated, coupled with a higher quantity required to replenish depleted pre-positioned stocks.

Maintenance and Sustainment

Under ITEF authority, the USG purchased and provided U.S. military equipment to support urgent operational requirements for the ISF. The purpose of this support was to generate and maintain momentum in the immediate fight against ISIS. Due to the pace of delivery required to support operations and the expectation that sustainment was an Iraqi responsibility, the equipment provided did not include maintenance and sustainment support that would normally be provided by the GoI or as part of a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) or Foreign Military Financing (FMF) case. The lack of organic Iraqi capacity to maintain ITEF and other equipment required to defeat ISIS is a critical weakness with the potential for severely negative operational impacts.

In order to preserve Iraqi combat power and the USG-invested equipment that can be used in operations to defeat ISIS, there is a requirement for maintenance and sustainment of the equipment already purchased. This program will facilitate ISF logistics sustainment capacity and enable the ISF to maintain sufficient combat power to accomplish assigned missions.

The Counter Terrorism Service (CTS) is Iraq’s premier fighting force. Requested additional funding will rebuild the CTS combat power lost in battle in East Mosul by back-filling combat loss vehicles and equipment and by training and equipping the personnel to rebuild the force amidst continuing casualties as the lead element liberating Mosul. HMMWVs and their reserve are down to 154 and are expected to be exhausted by late spring. Additionally, these funds allow for the CTS to pivot towards regional counter-terrorism work upon completion of the Mosul campaign. The CTS will serve as elite infantrymen and function as non-conventional forces to eliminate terrorist cells – both homegrown and externally directed. This sustainment is not intended to replace FMS and FMF programs, but rather, to complement it and to fill the gaps not covered by existing programs.

COUNTER-ISIS TRAIN AND EQUIP FUND
Site Improvements, Maintenance and Sustainment

It is expected that the current BPC sites will continue to operate while new advise and assist engagement or training sites will be established as the Iraqi security forces move north to and through Mosul. There is a projected need for one or more assembly areas designed to support final organization and refit of combat forces prior to entering combat as well as sites to support advise/assist operations and direct logistics support as supply lines are extended further from Baghdad. These sites will be critical to the success of the Mosul operation. Effective logistics support will be a key element required for Iraqi Security Forces’ success; remediating a critical operational weakness of the Iraqi military. The requested funding supports initial estimates regarding establishment of engagement and support areas, improvements related to training and training support systems, perimeter security, ammunition supply points, entry control points, and airfield maintenance – all to support Iraqi security force elements extending their logistics tail. These costs may also be associated with adding additional types of training to support other national security forces or missions required for success. The estimated costs, not transferred to the Iraqis, to continue to operate existing sites and/or establish new sites $64 million.

C. IMPACT IF NOT APPROVED:

The FY 2017 budget request builds upon the FY 2015 and FY 2016 ITEF program accomplishments and combat advances and is a key component in continuing to increase combat offensiveness of the ISF and Kurdish forces. If the National Security Apparatus, Iraq Security Force (Iraqi Army, Kurdish Peshmerga, CTS, MoI Police, Popular Mobilization Forces, Border Security and others with national security missions) do not receive the necessary training, equipment, advice, and assistance they will not be successful in liberating and holding areas, denying ISIS safe havens and producing an integrated force. Assisting the GoI in the development of a sustainable defense force is a cost-effective means of defeating ISIS and providing lasting improvements to the security and stability of Iraq.

It is critical to purchase items with long lead times now, to ensure they are available for use on the battlefield when needed. Equally important is the momentum that the ISF has gained against ISIS which cannot be squandered by failing to hold liberated areas, reconstitute and pivot to follow on operations. Without additional funding, the CJTF-OIR cannot continue prosecuting their counter-ISIS push. Long acquisition and delivery lead times dictate that equipment required for the fight in the fall must be ordered in the Spring. The additional funding removes funding as a battlefield constraint.

This assistance to the GoI and support to the ISF will also ensure continued U.S. influence in Iraq, reassure Iraqi Sunnis of their importance to the fight and GoI acceptance, and help provide security solutions in support of improved governance.
III. REQUIREMENTS IN SYRIA:

The United States Government (USG) strategy to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) directs the Department of Defense (DoD) and the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) to conduct a campaign to degrade, dismantle, and ultimately defeat ISIS. Key to successfully countering ISIS is training, equipping, and sustaining Vetted Syrian Opposition (VSO) forces, including Syrian Arab Coalition (SAC). The FY 2017 budget request provides the resources necessary to train, equip, and sustain VSO forces currently engaged in military operations while training additional forces.

To accomplish U.S. military objectives, VSO should be appropriately, trained, and supplied with weapons, ammunition, equipment, and sustainment to maintain security and stabilization of liberated areas while maintaining dominance on the battlefield. The relationship between VSO and U.S. forces is transactional and relies heavily on DoDs ability to provide training, weapons, ammunition, and equipment. The Department supports the VSO development into a legitimate and effective force by creating increased capability to effectively defeat ISIS in the Combined Joint Operations Area (CJOA). DoD must recruit, vet, train, and equip additional Syrians of different sects and ethnic groups of the Syrian population to enable them to engage ISIS across the battlespace.

The DoD plans to implement a curriculum that develops effective ground enablers, fosters an effective and reliable chain of command, and procures sufficient materiel to provide the supported forces with a significant advantage over the enemy. A potential risk to the program is that VSO forces may use the U.S. provided equipment and weapons for actions other than their intended purpose. The Department plans to mitigate risks through a variety of measures including using a rigorous and continuous screening process to identify and sustain viable Syrian opposition field commanders and units for participation in the program. An initial viability test determines a recruits ability and willingness to comply with appropriate use and inventory reports for non-military equipment and supplies. Once field commanders prove reliable, the SOJTF-OIR plans to introduce and incrementally provide additional military training, equipment, and supplies. The SOJTF-OIR plans to distribute all equipment and supplies through each trained VSO’s unit chain of command to reinforce commander credibility within the units.

The VSO force structure is currently more than 30,000 troops and all indications are that numbers will reach 40,000 by the end of FY 2018. About 90 percent of the available forces will be required to continue with operational momentum, while others secure internal lines. Although the partner force is more than 30,000 troops, the original FY 2017 budget only provides funding for about 14,000 to be trained and equipped properly, which left a capability gap for 53 percent of the partner force. The VSO movement, operational tempo, and combat effectiveness are correlated to the U. S. capability and capacity to train, advise, assist, and accompany the partner forces.
A. PROGRAM SUMMARY:

The original FY 2017 President’s Budget request for train and equip efforts in Syria funds training and equipment for about 14,000 partner force troops from the Vetted Syrian Opposition (VSO). The requested increase seeks to fund the required weapons, ammo, and equipment necessary to outfit an additional 16,000 partner force troops required to liberate and secure Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) controlled territories.

The FY 2017 budget request provides the resources necessary to generate a combat ready force. This includes sustainment and life support during training, and equipping and resupplying during operational missions, and the Contracted Logistics Support (CLS) and Field Service Representatives (FSR) crucial to performing the inventory accountability, maintenance, and distribution of equipment received and arriving in theater. As an example, the ruggedizing of vehicles, building gun mounts, and installing communications and navigational equipment is necessary prior to issuing vehicles.

Long lead times for weapons and ammunition dictate that the Department must fund these requirements in FY 2017 so that they can be provided to forces for operations in FY 2018. Also, the inability to consolidate non-U.S. source weapons and equipment in Europe increased transportation costs significantly. The DoD provides continuous monitoring of the vetted Syrian opposition forces in Syria and future payments, resupply, and training are contingent on battlefield effectiveness and the proper use of training, equipment and sustainment, including compliance with Law of Armed Conflict and respect for human rights.

The recurring requirements for this mission include weapons, ammunition, vehicles, communication equipment, and sustainment of each. Additionally, base life support to prevent non-battle injuries from sickness and disease, as well as transportation and staging equipment from the point of purchase to the battle area are critical requirements that reinforce success. The SAC/VSO employ a spectrum of combined arms capabilities, including anti-tank and indirect fire, bolstered by the mobility, gunnery, and communications platforms of their modified organic vehicles. The VSO require consistent reliable logistical support to replenish of critical supplies to sustain defensive perimeters, offensive operations, and to reseed combat losses. Specifically, weapons, ammunition, medical supplies and mobility vehicles are critical requirements after each major engagement.
The following is a summary of the train and equip requirements in Syria by line of effort:

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<td>+180.0</td>
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B. PROGRAM DESCRIPTION/JUSTIFICATION:

Weapons, Ammunition, and Equipment

Weapons and ammunition estimates are based on training and initial equipping the VSO forces plus combat resupply. Ammunition resupply of VSO engaged in tactical missions is essential to combating enemy forces and directly correlates with the Theater Supply Chain Management for air and ground resupply. The provision of equipment sets and supplies varies based partly on capabilities and partly on the combat conditions these forces may face in Syria. Lethal equipment sets may include non-NATO standard small arms (i.e., AK-47s, and PKM machine guns) heavy weapons (i.e., DShk machine guns), mortar systems (i.e., 60mm, 82mm and 120mm mortars), anti-tank weapons (i.e., rocket propelled grenades), and respective maintenance kits. This request includes first station destination costs where equipment is palletized for lift into theater.

Weapons and ammunition estimates are based on current operational requirements coupled with lead time for items. Combat loss estimates are included in quantities required. Estimates are based upon training and equipping the VSO forces to include resupply during operational mission support. Ammunition resupply during tactical missions is essential to defeat ISIS.

Other Equipment estimates are comprised of non-lethal equipment sets that include uniforms, hygiene kits, medical equipment, communications equipment, navigational aids, and vehicles for hauling cargo, mounted weapons and VSO personnel. The majority of non-lethal equipment is commercially available and not military issue. The majority of vehicles are variants that are widely available in the local market. This availability ensures that most can be maintained or repaired from commercial sources inside Syria and from spare parts delivered to the SAC/VSO.

Base Life Support

Trainee BLS requirements are for training forces at training locations and nodes within Turkey and Jordan. This budget request provides subsistence, sanitation, power generation, Class IV, laundry, wastewater removal, shower/latrines and communications at training and mission support sites for trainees. Additionally, the sustainment request provides the VSO funding for training and operations cost, contracted medical support in Jordan and Turkey, stipends, and funding for reimbursable logistics services provided by host nations. Sustainment for T&E forces employed in Syria is provided to the greatest extent possible by coalition forces at sites outside Syria or distributed by other available means without U.S. forces entering Syria. The request includes funding for requirements for logistics support provided by partner nation’s military in Jordan and Turkey for costs of services provided by those host nations not previously agreed to in Technical Understandings or Memorandums of Agreement. Every effort is made to avoid
FY 2017 OVERSEAS CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS (OCO) REQUEST  
COUNTER-ISIS TRAIN AND EQUIP FUND (CTEF)

having to utilize these agreements, however experience in these countries necessitate providing reimbursement for logistics support provided via T&E host nation military mechanisms.

**Transportation and Staging Costs**

Transportation and Staging includes Strategic Lift (STRATLIFT) into the theater of operations was estimated for weapons, ammunition, and equipment from depots to staging areas by air and sea to include U.S. and Partner Nation donations.

The largest transportation and staging cost driver is First Destination Travel from the point of sale/manufacture to CONUS staging areas of depots. Once received, the equipment is accounted for and repackaged for onward movement into theater via STRATLIFT or SEALIFT. This increase request was based upon estimates of 30 C-17 sorties at $500K per lift from CONUS into theater. Transportation cost estimates include ground movement and air drops as most items will not flow directly into Syria, but rather stage in Turkey, Jordan, or Kuwait. Once staged, the items will be prepared for rapid movement into the battle area. Sea movement, if feasible, will be used in lieu of air movement, in an effort to reduce transportation costs.

Other transportation and staging mainly includes Intra-Theater Transportation requirements based on historic and estimated air and ground movement of weapons, ammunition, and equipment from airfields or seaports to staging or storage areas and distribution and resupply of VSO forces. Ammunition resupply of VSO engaged in tactical missions is essential to combatting enemy forces. Operational requirements are based on VSO mission development as they successfully combat ISIS to gain and hold territory in the CJOA requiring ammunition resupply and equipment replacement/maintenance.

**Operational Sustainment and Emerging Costs**

Operational Sustainment is essential to the survivability of VSO forces combatting ISIS across Syria. Major cost drivers include Satellite Communications (SATCOM) and emerging mission costs from the dynamic, unconventional warfare battle space. Trainee stipends are incentive based payments ranging from $200 to $400 per trainee per month. These stipends are paid to those previously trained VSO forces actively engaged in the fight against ISIS as well as to new, appropriately vetted, trainees inducted into the program in FY 2017.

The Operational sustainment increase requested includes an additional $400K for stipends and $3.2 million for emerging requirements. Emerging requirements are part of the dynamic nature of unconventional warfare. The funds associated with emerging requirements allow the commander’s budgeting cycle and resources to keep pace with the speed of operational decisions.
C. IMPACT IF NOT APPROVED:

The FY 2017 budget request furthers critical efforts accomplished since FY 2015 and is a key component of the transregional strategy to counter ISIS in Syria, Iraq, and beyond. The request provides resourcing to retain the flexibility to support VSO in a very dynamic, evolving unconventional warfare environment. If the funding for the VSO forces is not provided, U.S. security and stability goals and momentum against ISIS in Syria and the surrounding area will fail. There would be a significant loss of credibility and reluctance of opposition forces and neighboring nations to rely on or trust the United States to meet commitments. It is critical to build on the successes that capable opposition forces have already demonstrated in countering ISIS attacks, regaining lost territory, and providing safe enclaves for Syrian civilians. The VSO trained and equipped to date have enhanced the ability of the U.S. and coalition allies to conduct deliberate and dynamic fires against ISIS and have greatly increased the capabilities and confidence of the VSO groups in which they operate.

It is in the best interest of the United States to train, equip, and supply VSO as the force to defeat ISIS in Syria and to deny ISIS a sanctuary to plan and execute external operations. If not countered, ISIS will continue to attract extremist elements, including many foreigners, to fight and learn their terrorist trade and export those skills and extremism back to the nations they came from, continue to create waves of refugees and internally displaced persons, create broader sectarian conflict throughout the region, and ultimately increase the direct risks of terrorism and hostility focused towards the United States.

A critical resource gap exists in the FY 2017 budget to support the VSO forces. Nearly 16,000 VSO of the 30,000 needed for ongoing and future operations cannot be properly equipped with weapons, ammunition, and mobility assets. This budget increase reinforces the critical gains that have been made to counter ISIS since 2015. If not fully funded in FY 2017, operational momentum against ISIS in Syria will stall. Moreover, there may be a significant loss of credibility and reluctance of opposition forces to rely on or trust the United States to meet commitments if partner forces are not properly resourced.
IV. PROPOSED APPROPRIATIONS LANGUAGE:

COUNTER-ISLAMIC STATE OF IRAQ AND SYRIA TRAIN AND EQUIP FUND

For the "Counter-Islamic State of Iraq and Syria Train and Equip Fund", $1,506,400,000, to remain available until September 30, 2018:

Provided, That such funds shall be available to the Secretary of Defense in coordination with the Secretary of State, to provide assistance, including training; equipment; logistics support, supplies, and services; stipends; infrastructure repair and renovation; construction of training facilities; small-scale construction of temporary facilities necessary to meet urgent operational or force protection requirements; and sustainment, to foreign security forces, irregular forces, groups, or individuals participating, or preparing to participate in activities to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, and their affiliated or associated groups:

Provided further, That these funds may be used, in such amounts as the Secretary of Defense may determine, to enhance the border security of nations adjacent to conflict areas, including Jordan and Lebanon, resulting from actions of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria:

Provided further, That amounts made available under this heading shall be available to provide assistance only for activities in a country designated by the Secretary of Defense, in coordination with the Secretary of State, as having a security mission to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, and following written notification to the congressional defense committees of such designation:

Provided further, That the authority to provide assistance under this heading is in addition to any other authority to provide assistance to foreign nations:

Provided further, That the Secretary of Defense shall, not fewer than 15 days prior to obligating from this appropriation account, notify the congressional defense committees in writing of the details of any such obligation:

Provided further, That the Secretary of Defense may accept and retain contributions, including assistance in-kind, from foreign governments, including the Government of Iraq and other entities, to carry out assistance authorized under this heading:

Provided further, That contributions of funds for the purposes provided herein from any foreign government or other entity may be credited to this Fund, to remain available until expended, and used for such purposes:
Provided further, That the Secretary of Defense may waive a provision of law relating to the acquisition of items and support services or sections 40 and 40A of the Arms Export Control Act (22 U.S.C. 2780 and 2785) if the Secretary determines that such provision of law would prohibit, restrict, delay or otherwise limit the provision of such assistance and a notice of and justification for such waiver is submitted to the congressional defense committees, the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Relations of the Senate and the Committees on Appropriations and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives:

Provided further, That the United States may accept equipment procured using funds provided under this heading, or under the heading, "Iraq Train and Equip Fund" in prior Acts, that was transferred to security forces, irregular forces, or groups participating, or preparing to participate in activities to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria and returned by such forces or groups to the United States, may be treated as stocks of the Department of Defense upon written notification to the congressional defense committees:

Provided further, That equipment procured using funds provided under this heading, or under the heading, "Iraq Train and Equip Fund" in prior Acts, and not yet transferred to security forces, irregular forces, or groups participating, or preparing to participate in activities to counter the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria may be treated as stocks of the Department of Defense when determined by the Secretary to no longer be required for transfer to such forces or groups and upon written notification to the congressional defense committees:

Provided further, That the Secretary of Defense shall provide quarterly reports to the congressional defense committees on the use of funds provided under this heading, including, but not limited to, the number of individuals trained, the nature and scope of support and sustainment provided to each group or individual, the area of operations for each group, and the contributions of other countries, groups, or individuals:

Provided further, That such amount is designated by the Congress for Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism pursuant to section 251(b)(2)(A)(ii) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985.